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DICTA, SCHMICTA: THEORY VERSUS PRACTICE IN LOWER
COURT DECISION MAKING
DAVID KLEIN* & NEAL DEVINS**
ABSTRACT
The distinction between dictum and holding is at once central to
the American legal system and largely irrelevant. In the first sys-
tematic empirical study of lower court invocations of the distinction,
we show that lower courts hardly ever refuse to follow a statement
from a higher court because it is dictum. Specifically, federal courts
of appeals meaningfully invoke the distinction in about 1 in 4000
cases; federal district courts in about 1 in 2000 cases; and state
courts in about 1 in 4000 cases. In this Essay, we report these find-
ings, describe our coding system, and offer a preliminary assessment
of the implications of our study. Most notably, our findings raise
questions about the vitality of traditional common law judging.
Rather than play a significant role in the development of legal prin-
ciples by treating extraneous statements in higher court rulings as
nonbinding dicta, lower courts cede much of their common law power
to higher courts. Higher courts can issue sweeping rulings that ad-
dress questions not immediately before them, knowing that those
statements will not be treated as dicta. In highlighting this dynamic
between lower and higher courts, our study also casts light on the
ongoing debate over judicial minimalism. The ability of courts to
pursue the minimalist project of issuing narrow, fact-specific rulings
is undercut by a regime in which lower courts look to higher courts
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for the enunciation of legal principles. Finally, our study is highly
salient to the practice of law. Lawyers, although frequently referenc-
ing the holding-dictum distinction in legal briefs, have little reason
to think that a lower court will ever invoke the distinction to rule
against higher court dicta. 
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INTRODUCTION
One of the spirited debates set off by the Supreme Court’s health
care decision1 has nothing to do with the quality of the Justices’
legal reasoning or what the policy consequences of the decision
should be. Rather, it revolves around the question of whether Chief
Justices Roberts’s opinion should be considered “holding” or
“dictum.” Because the Affordable Care Act was ultimately upheld
under the taxing power,2 academics, practitioners, and the Justices
themselves squared off on what precedential weight, if any,
should be given to the Chief Justice’s determination that Congress
could not compel participation in the health insurance market
under its commerce power.3 For Randy Barnett, who championed
the Commerce Clause argument embraced by Roberts, the opinion
was holding because Roberts claimed that he would not have even
considered the taxing power argument if the statute were a per-
missible use of Congress’s commerce power.4 For Jack Balkin, who
vigorously defended the statute, the Roberts opinion was arguably
dictum;5 for Justice Ginsburg it was not “outcome determinative”
and therefore unnecessary.6 
Why this debate? Because dictum and holding are usually
thought to be entitled to very different weight in the American legal
system, as in other common law systems: “A court’s holding defines
the scope of its power; holdings must be obeyed.... Dicta is the stuff
that doesn’t have to be obeyed.”7 If Roberts’s commerce power
1. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
2. Id. at 2608 (5-4 decision regarding the taxing power).
3. Id. at 2591 (5-4 decision regarding the commerce power).
4. Randy Barnett, Op-Ed., We Lost on Healthcare. But the Constitution Won., WASH. POST
(June 29, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/randy-barnett-we-lost-on-health-
care-but-the-constitution-won/2012/06/29/gJQAzJuJCW_story.html; see also Ilya Somin, A
Simple Solution to the Holding vs. Dictum Mess, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 2, 2012, 3:47 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/02/a-simple-solution-to-the-holding-vs-dictum-mess.
5. Jack Balkin, Supreme Court Year in Review Entry 18: That Boring Old Tax Argument
Was Always a Winner, SLATE (June 28, 2012, 7:08 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2012/_supreme_court_year_in_review/sup
reme_court_year_in_review_it_was_always_about_the_tax_.html.
6. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2629 n.12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
7. David Post, Commerce Clause “Holding v. Dictum Mess” Not So Simple, VOLOKH
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determination is a holding, then lower courts are bound to follow it
in future cases; if it is dictum, their only obligation is to give his rea-
soning respectful consideration.
No doubt, the distinction between holding and dictum is central
to the American legal system—in theory.8 But theory is one thing,
practice another.9 The point of this Essay is to ask how much is
really at stake in this debate over whether the Roberts opinion is
dictum and, more generally, whether a court opinion can be labeled
as holding or dictum. Our concern is not the normative question of
how a court should act but the empirical question of how much the
distinction matters for the impact of higher courts’ language on
lower courts’ decisions.
This Essay speaks to the continuing vitality of the holding-dictum
distinction through the first systematic study of how lower courts
treat higher court dicta.10 As we will show, the gap between dicta-in-
CONSPIRACY (July 3, 2012, 8:17 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/03/commerce-clause-
holding-v-dictum-mess-not-so-simple/. For a competing perspective, see Somin, supra note 4
(suggesting that the court deciding a case has the power to declare what is holding and what
is dictum). For other commentary on this issue, see Gideon, The Language About the
Commerce Clause Was Non-Binding Dictum, DAILY KOS (June 29, 2012, 6:57 AM), http://
www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/29/1104308/-The-language-about-the-Commerce-Clause-was-
non-binding-dictum; William A. Jacobson, What If That Huge Conservative Doctrinal
Achievement Was Mere Dicta?, LEGAL INSURRECTION (June 29, 2012, 4:36 PM), http://
legalinsurrection.com/2012/06/what-if-that-huge-conservative-doctrinal-achievement-was-
mere-dicta/; Warren Richey, Questions About Chief Justice’s Health-Care Ruling Could Have
Lasting Impact, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 3, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
Justice/2012/0703/Questions-about-chief-justice-s-health-care-ruling-could-have-lasting-
impact.
8. Most notably, the holding-dictum distinction reflects the common law precept that
legal principles develop incrementally, with any one decision having only a limited impact.
See generally Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997 (1994); Pierre N.
Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1259-60
(2006). The Supreme Court has long recognized that statements that “go beyond the case ...
may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit.” Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821).
9. Academic studies of the holding-dictum distinction have largely focused on the
drawing of the line separating holding from dictum. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell
Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005); Dorf, supra note 8; Kent Greenawalt,
Reflections on Holding and Dictum, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 431 (1989).
10. The holding-dictum distinction is also relevant to higher court consideration of its own
precedent. We focus on the vertical relationship between higher and lower courts both because
of the centrality of this dynamic to the future of common law judging, and because it is
capable of empirical assessment. In Part III.A of this Essay, we detail the ways in which our
findings speak to the vitality of common law judging. For a discussion of the difficulties of
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theory and dicta-in-practice is strikingly large. Lower courts often
mention the distinction between holding and dictum but hardly ever
invoke it in consequential ways. In calendar years 2008-2010, the
focus of this study, nearly 14,000 out of about 700,000 Westlaw-
reported cases contained allusions to the distinction, but lower
courts refused to follow a directive from a higher court because they
regarded it as dictum in only about 220 of these cases.11 That is,
lower courts made meaningful use of the holding-dictum distinction
in fewer than 1 in every 3000 cases. 
In our view, the disjunction between dicta-in-practice and dicta-
in-theory in lower court decision making has important descriptive
and normative implications. The power of lower courts to interpret
higher court rulings and, in so doing, demarcate the line that sep-
arates dictum from holding is a key constraint on the hierarchical
relationship between higher and lower courts. Lower courts’ will-
ingness or reluctance to assert their own authority by challenging
dicta fundamentally affects the ways in which higher and lower
courts speak to each other and shape the law.12
Even more importantly, in the traditional image of common law
judging, broad doctrine emerges over time as principles uniting
individual cases come into focus.13 Under this view, lower courts
play a critical role in the development of legal principles by exer-
cising their own judgment as to the implications and applicability
of past decisions. Treatments of dictum as holding disrupt this pro-
cess by permitting more sudden and sweeping changes in doctrine. 
Relatedly, the vitality of the holding-dictum distinction is
highly relevant to the ongoing debate over judicial minimalism.
Minimalists argue that narrow, fact-specific holdings are less prone
evaluating higher court treatments of its own dicta, see infra text accompanying note 40.
11. We present detailed data and findings in Part II.
12. This is not to say that lower courts always rule in ways consistent with higher court
dicta. It is possible, for example, that lower courts evade the force of higher court dicta by
making precedent-based distinctions. At the same time, for reasons we will discuss, infra Part
III.A, lower courts still bow to the authority of higher courts by pursuing such middle course
alternatives.
13. Michael Dorf describes this process as lower court “elaboration” of higher court
precedent and distinguishes it from the “execution” model, in which lower courts believe “that
their job is to execute the law as found in already decided cases, but not to craft novel
interpretations.” Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 664-
66 (1995).
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to factual error and more likely to facilitate constructive conversa-
tions among courts, elected officials, and the American people.14
Whether or not these claims are correct, lower court treatments of
dictum as holding complicate the pursuit of the judicial minimalists’
project. In particular, judicial minimalism looks to lower courts to
examine the workability of higher court precedent in different fac-
tual contexts, including changes brought about by social and polit-
ical developments.15 
The Essay proceeds in three Parts. We begin by describing the
centrality of the holding-dictum distinction to both the development
of law and the broader academic debate about whether courts
should issue minimalist decisions. In the second Part, we describe
our sample of federal and state court decisions, explain and illus-
trate our coding criteria and decisions, and present our findings,
casting doubt on the willingness of lower courts to participate in a
dynamic interchange with higher courts in the development of legal
principles. We conclude with a preliminary assessment of the ram-
ifications of this study for the dynamic between higher and lower
courts and the vitality of traditional common law judging.
I. THE HOLDING-DICTUM DISTINCTION IN THEORY
The distinction between holding and dictum reflects fundamental
norms of American law, from the common law precept that legal
principles develop incrementally, with any one decision having only
a limited impact, to Article III’s requirement that judges decide
concrete disputes and not issue advisory opinions. As Karl Llewellyn
put it, a “court can decide nothing but the legal dispute before it....
Everything, but everything, said in an opinion is to be read and
understood only in relation to the actual case before the court.”16
14. For general treatments of judicial minimalism, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999); Neal Devins, The
Democracy-Forcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971 (1999); Christopher J. Peters,
Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454 (2000).
15. Judicial minimalism likewise asks higher courts to revisit their own precedent by
looking at subsequent factual developments as well as the actions of elected officials and the
American people. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at x.
16. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 14 (Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael
Ansaldi trans., 1989) (emphasis omitted).
2028 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:2021
The importance of the distinction to legal theory is highlighted
from the beginning of a lawyer’s training. Law students are often
taught that the American legal system sees dicta as neither binding
nor normatively desirable and typically spend significant time and
energy looking for the line separating the two.17 In constitutional
law, students learn that the very case that established judicial
review, Marbury v. Madison, is filled with dicta. Specifically, be-
cause the Court discussed the merits of the Marbury dispute before
concluding that the Court was without jurisdiction to rule in favor
of the plaintiff, Marbury is often depicted as a prime example of
judicial overreaching.18 More tellingly, the case method that dom-
inates legal instruction teaches students that the legal craft is about
the careful reading of cases and, with that, the ability to separate
holding from dictum. For law students, to treat dictum as holding
is to misunderstand the case before them. 
The importance of the distinction is also reflected in concerted
efforts by scholars to delineate it19 and by the fact that lawyers and
judges speak of it so often. As we will explain shortly, we found, over
a three-year period, several thousand cases per year in which judges
used the term “dicta” or “dictum” in an opinion. During the same
three-year period, there were 8406 references to dicta in federal
court of appeals briefs and 12,946 references in state court of ap-
peals and state supreme court briefs.20
The reason the dicta concept matters so much to theory and, in
our view, deserves far more empirical attention, is that it gets to the
17. Judge Pierre N. Leval went so far as to argue that law students “are not well trained
for the profession” if they do not understand the difference between holding and dictum.
Leval, supra note 8, at 1282; see also Greenawalt, supra note 9, at 431.
18. In particular, because the Court ruled against Marbury on jurisdictional grounds, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176, 180 (1803), the Court’s discussion of whether Marbury was entitled
to a judicial commission, id. at 162, 167-68, had nothing to do with the ultimate resolution of
the case. Academics and law school casebooks regularly call attention to this fact, typically
to question this aspect of the Court’s decision. For one particularly well-known example, see
William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1. For an
alternative view, see Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709,
1736-37 (1998) (defending Marshall’s “advicegiving” in Marbury).
19. For a sampling of this literature, see supra note 9.
20. These numbers are based on a Westlaw search of “dicta” or “dictum” in the databases
of federal court of appeals briefs and state court of appeals and supreme court briefs. See E-
mail from Fred Dingledy, Reference Librarian, William & Mary Law Sch., to Professor Neal
Devins, William & Mary Law Sch. (July 30, 2012, 9:03 AM) (on file with author).
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core of how the law is made in a system of precedent. When few
efforts are made to distinguish dictum from holding, the dynamics
of judicial decision making will resemble what Michael Sean Quinn
has called an “Imperial Theory” of precedent. Under this approach,
“when a principle of law has been deliberated upon (i.e., thought
about), expressly formulated, and posited as law by an appellate
court, it must be followed in similar cases.”21 The result is a system
of concentrated law-making power. “The past dominates the pres-
ent. Higher courts dominate lower courts. Any feedback from lower
courts to higher courts is accomplished informally. Lower courts
have little discretion.”22
In contrast, the more strictly courts distinguish between holding
and dictum, the more closely we can expect the system of precedent
to correspond to a traditional view of common law judging. In this
view, the law-making power of the precedent-setting court is more
circumscribed, and law develops more flexibly. As Edward Levi put
it in his classic book on legal reasoning, “the doctrine of dicta forces”
the judge deciding a case to make her “own decision.”23 She 
is not bound by the statement of the rule of law made by the
prior judge even in the controlling case.... It is not what the prior
judge intended that is of any importance; rather it is what the
present judge, attempting to see the law as a fairly consistent
whole, thinks should be the determining classification.24
Under this traditional view, lower courts both reason by analogy
and take into account changing conditions—either factual or policy
developments—when “elaborating” on higher court precedent.25
What is at stake is not just how the law is made, but how well it
is made. Much of the legal literature about dicta—and the related
prohibition of advisory opinions—at least implicitly favors the
21. Michael Sean Quinn, Argument and Authority in Common Law Advocacy and
Adjudication: An Irreducible Pluralism of Principles, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 655, 698 (1999);
see also Dorf, supra note 13, at 664-68 (discussing “execution” theory of precedent and
distinguishing it from the “elaboration” theory of common law decision making).
22. Quinn, supra note 21, at 704.
23. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 3 (1949).
24. Id. at 2-3.
25. Dorf, supra note 13, at 665-67.
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traditional approach to precedent.26 In explaining why dicta need
not be followed, for example, Michael Dorf advances both legitimacy
arguments (“courts have legitimate authority only to decide cases,
not to make law in the abstract”) and instrumental arguments
(“[d]icta are less carefully considered than holdings, and, therefore,
less likely to be accurate statements of law”).27 Correspondingly,
scholars who embrace judicial minimalism caution that courts must
recognize limits in their ability to craft doctrinal solutions that are
workable over a broad range of issues. By limiting their rulings to
the case before them, judges can learn about the consequences of
different legal holdings and pursue an “empirically informed” juris-
prudence in which judicial errors are “less frequent and (above all)
less damaging.”28 When “the relevant facts are in flux and changing
very rapidly, and the consequences of current developments are
hard to foresee,”29 courts should exercise caution to avoid risking
populist attacks on their legitimacy and reprisals from elected of-
ficials.
Dicta, no doubt, are disfavored by courts and most legal scholars.
At the same time, some scholars who caution against the use of
dicta recognize that judicial advice giving is not always inappropri-
ate.30 For example, a higher court that invalidates governmental
conduct on statutory grounds might nonetheless signal that the con-
stitutionality of the statute is also in doubt—so that an agency or
legislative body should not assume that the government can pursue
its favored policy without risking a constitutional challenge.31 More
significantly, some scholars embrace either informal judicial advice
26. For a general treatment of the prohibition against advisory opinions, see Phillip M.
Kannan, Advising Opinions by Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 769 (1998). Unlike federal
courts, some state courts are required by either statute or state constitutional provision to
render advisory opinions. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”:
Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1845-46 (2001).
27. Dorf, supra note 8, at 2000-01; see also Leval, supra note 8, at 1255-60 (offering both
legitimacy and instrumental arguments to caution against the reliance on dicta).
28. SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 4, 255.
29. Id. at 174.
30. For an argument that advice giving is inevitable, see Frederick Schauer, Giving
Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 655 (1995) (arguing that appellate courts inevitably give advice
because the reasons they give for their decisions are always more general than the specific
proposition before the court).
31. Dorf, supra note 8, at 2006-07.
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giving or the formal issuance of broad judicial rules. According to
Neal Katyal, 
The most obvious advantages of advicegiving flow from its
nature as dicta, particularly its ability to mediate the tensions
in a system of law based on stare decisis.... Advice in judicial
decisions acts as a compromise—such language does not have
the binding force of a holding yet provides some guidance and
predictability for the future while simultaneously undermining
some of the reliance interests that would mandate future
application of stare decisis.32
A judicial formalist might go one step further, calling for higher
courts to bind lower courts through broad judicial rulings—rulings
that may speak to a range of issues not directly before the court.
Recognizing that “an important function of law is to settle author-
itatively what is to be done,”33 one could view binding, authorita-
tive settlements of legal disputes by high courts as salutary.
Authoritative settlement may also solve coordination problems—
that is, problems related to the uncertainty of knowing whether a
legal ruling will or will not apply in factually distinguishable cases
—and thus, serve efficiency values.34
These competing normative perspectives on judges’ role in the
development of law imply different views of where the line between
holding and dictum should be drawn. Judicial minimalists would
likely embrace a narrower view of what constitutes a holding and,
in so doing, categorize as dictum any language that is not necessary
to the resolution of a dispute before the court. Under this view,
lower courts have substantial authority to shape the development
of law by enforcing the holding-dictum distinction and otherwise
engage in common law judging. Formalists would likely prefer
broad, authoritative judicial opinions and be more likely to treat
32. Katyal, supra note 18, at 1714.
33. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1371 (1997). For a competing perspective, see Neal Devins & Louis
Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83 (1998) (arguing that
stability in the law is best achieved through a dynamic process in which other parts of
government challenge Supreme Court rulings).
34. See Larry Alexander, “With Me, It’s All er Nuthin’”: Formalism in Law and Morality,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 530, 534 (1999).
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such statements as part of the court’s holding. More fundamentally,
formalists look for higher courts to lay down rules that will con-
strain the discretion of lower court judges. 
In the next Part, we investigate whether the role that lower
courts actually play comes closer to a minimalist ideal or a formalist
ideal. More precisely, we ask how often judges identify a preceden-
tial statement as dictum and decide at least some question in the
case differently than they would have if they saw the language as
a holding. In doing so, we recognize that the behavior of lower courts
is only part of the story, for higher court treatment of its own dicta
also speaks to both the salience of the holding-dictum distinction
and the debate between minimalists and formalists.35 Nonetheless,
we believe our focus on lower courts is the best place to start looking
at the real-world importance of the holding-dictum distinction. 
In part, as we will soon detail, lower court invocations of the dis-
tinction are better suited to empirical measurement than are
higher court invocations. More significantly, the behavior of lower
courts is crucial to the common law system of judging. Because
cases originate in lower courts and the vast majority are terminated
there, it is lower courts’ treatment of dicta that matters most for
how the legal system operates. Even if higher courts freely disre-
gard their own dicta, if lower courts do not—that is, if lower courts
treat dicta as holdings—then dicta will be part of the law as
experienced by lawyers, litigants, and potential litigants. 
II. THE DISTINCTION IN PRACTICE
We are not the first to wonder how well theory and practice align
with respect to dicta. In fact, there have been fairly frequent reports
in recent years of failures to distinguish between dictum and
holding. Academics contend that judicial opinions “are often larded
with dicta,” including “passing observations, generalizations, anal-
ogies, illustrations, or asides not necessary to the resolution of the
case.”36 A federal circuit judge wrote, “I cannot tell you how many
times I have read briefs asserting an improbable proposition of law
35. See, e.g., Leval, supra note 8, at 1250 (“We judges regularly undertake to promulgate
law through utterance of dictum made to look like a holding .... Also, we accept dictum uttered
in a previous opinion as if it were binding law, which governs our subsequent adjudication.”).
36. EVA H. HANKS ET AL., ELEMENTS OF LAW 64 (2d ed. 2010).
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and citing a case as authority ... [only to find that] the proposition
is indeed there, but was uttered in dictum.”37 Still, these reports are
largely impressionistic and not specifically focused on the behavior
of lower courts. Determining how important the dicta distinction is
to lower court judging requires systematic investigation of how dicta
from above are treated.38 We provide that here, examining how
often, when judges see a precedential statement as dictum, they
decide at least one question in the case differently than they would
have if they saw the language as a holding.
Our investigation is inevitably somewhat complicated, for the
mere fact that a court invokes the distinction or refers to a state-
ment as “dictum” does not mean that the distinction has real con-
sequences for the judge’s actions. For instance, it is common for a
court to describe a statement from another court as dictum but
decide consistently with that statement.39 In that situation, the
distinction plays no role in the decision; the end result is precisely
the same as if the statement were classified as a holding. To under-
stand the role of dictum and holding in judicial decision making, it
is crucial that we identify criteria for determining when the
distinction actually produces a decision or opinion that is different
in important ways from what would have been produced in a system
that does not recognize the distinction. 
For this very reason, there is much more to be learned from ex-
amining how lower courts treat dicta from higher courts than
examining how higher courts treat their own dicta. Consider, for
example, a case in which a higher court judge justifies discounting
precedent from her own court on the ground that it is dictum. When
this occurs, there is no way of knowing whether the judge would
have reached the opposite result if she had thought the precedent
37. Leval, supra note 8, at 1263; see also Thomas L. Fowler, Holding, Dictum ... Whatever,
25 N.C. CENT. L.J. 139 (2003); Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It
Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 219 (2010).
38. The closest to such an investigation is Josh Blackman, Much Ado About Dictum; or,
How to Evade Precedent Without Really Trying: The Distinction Between Holding and
Dictum (Dec. 10, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1318389, in which the author read all cases identified by West as discussing the concept of
dictum in order to catalogue the approaches courts put forward for distinguishing between
holding and dictum and responding to dictum. 
39. See, e.g., United States v. Baird, 85 F.3d 450, 453 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e treat Supreme
Court dicta with due deference, and see no reason not to apply [it] in the case at bar.”).
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was a holding instead of dictum. Even assuming that the norm of
stare decisis matters to judges, the fact is that they can normally
overrule, limit, or otherwise change precedents they dislike at will.40
It seems certain that in at least some—and perhaps many—cases
labeling precedent from one’s own court as dictum is a largely rhe-
torical move, used to justify an action the court would have taken
anyway. If the concept of dicta did not exist, the decisions in these
cases would be no different. Of course, we cannot be certain that
this is true in any particular case, but counting all such cases as
examples of the distinction’s meaningful influence would undoubt-
edly overstate that influence.
In contrast, when a lower court avoids the force of a higher court’s
statement by labeling it dictum, we can be more certain that the
dicta distinction played a key role in its thinking. A lower court is
considered bound by the precedent of the court or courts above it. A
court would violate its professional obligations if it failed to apply
relevant precedent, and this failure would be expected to bring both
reversal by the higher court and censure from the bar and bench.41
When a lower court invokes the concept of dictum as the basis for
evading the force of a higher court’s statement, the court concedes
that it otherwise would be obligated to apply the statement. More
than this, the court calls attention to its refusal. Hence, the rhe-
torical role played by the distinction is quite different from in the
higher court—inviting examination and criticism rather than
deflecting them. 
Thus, we focus in this Essay on cases in which a court identifies
a statement from a higher court as nonbinding dictum. For each
such case, we determine whether the holding-dictum distinction
plays a central role in justifying a decision at odds with the higher
court’s statement. In the following Section, we explain the criteria
we relied on to make this determination, demonstrate how they
were applied, and report our findings about the general unwilling-
ness of federal courts of appeals, federal district courts, and state
40. Stare decisis, of course, does not apply to situations in which higher courts review
lower court decision making. Consequently, when higher courts reference dicta in lower court
decision making, it is impossible to draw any conclusions about whether the fact of its being
dicta was important to its decision.
41. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
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courts to invoke the holding-dictum distinction in consequential
ways. Before doing so, we describe our search method and sample. 
A. The Cases
Our data are drawn from opinions handed down from the
beginning of 2008 to the end of 2010 by U.S. federal and state trial
and intermediate appellate courts. These opinions were identified
through full-text searches in Westlaw for the terms “dictum,”
“dicta,” “not a holding,” or “not the holding.” Both formally pub-
lished and unpublished opinions are included.
The search yielded 1649 cases from the U.S. courts of appeals,
8809 cases from U.S. district courts, and 3365 cases from state trial
and intermediate appellate courts. Because these were too many
cases to code, we randomly sampled several hundred cases from
each set: specifically, 330 (20%) from the U.S. courts of appeals, 440
(5%) from U.S. district courts, and 336 (10%) from state courts.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that 13,823 hits in these three
years strikes us as conclusive evidence that the concept of dictum is
alive and present in judges’ minds. What it does not tell us is
whether the concept is consequential for their decision making.
To address this question, we must look at the sample of 1106
cases more closely. First we must isolate those cases in which the
opinion of the court identifies a statement from a hierarchical
superior as dictum or denies that it is a holding. A total of 213 cases
fit this criterion. Of the 893 cases that do not, 201 involve references
to the citing court’s own precedent, 264 involve references to
precedent from another court with no authority over the citing
court, and 428 do not involve a reference to precedent.42 
42. The references in the last category took a variety of forms, such as abstract
discussions of the concept, quotations in which a scholar or another court referred to a
statement as dictum, and rejections of litigants’ claims that certain statements were dicta.
Notably, a number of these cases involved quotations of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2000), in which the Supreme Court, interpreting language in the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, said that in habeas corpus proceedings, “‘clearly established
Federal law’... refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of the
time of the relevant state-court decision.” Id. at 375, 412. A handful of cases in this category
did involve references to precedent but were excluded because the references appeared in a
concurring or dissenting opinion, not the opinion of the citing court.
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For the remainder of this Essay, we focus on the 213 cases in
which a lower court identified a statement from a higher court as
dictum. Each of the 213 was coded independently by two different
coders to determine whether the holding-dictum distinction could
reasonably be seen as playing a key role in the court’s decision.
When both coders reached the same conclusion—either positive
(that the distinction could be viewed as having affected the decision)
or negative (that it could not)—that conclusion was accepted. In the
twenty-eight cases in which the coders reached different conclusions
or either expressed doubt, the case was reanalyzed and discussed
until a confident conclusion could be reached. When we were unable
to decide with confidence, the case was recorded as a positive
example.
B. Findings
As became abundantly clear very early in this study, the mere
fact that a lower court identifies a statement from a higher court as
dictum does not mean that the lower court is unwilling to act as if
the statement were a holding. In fact, sixty-eight (32%) of our cases
are examples of unambiguously positive citations, in which the
statement in question is cited in support of a particular proposition,
and the citing court gives no indication that it is free to disregard
the statement. The only thing distinguishing these from ordinary
positive citations is that the citing court identifies the statement, in
passing, as dictum.
Some of these are just casual references in string citations.43
Many are more substantive. For instance, in a 2009 case, the Court
of Appeals of Oregon justified a decision this way:
We base that conclusion on two factors.... Second, in Moore v.
Motor Vehicles Division, the [Oregon] Supreme Court (in dictum)
stated, “An administratively imposed penalty based on [a legally
43. E.g., IGY Ocean Bay Props., Ltd. v. Ocean Bay Props. I Ltd., 534 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“However, diversity does not exist within the meaning of these sections
where on both sides of the dispute the parties are all foreign entities, or where on one side
there are citizens and aliens and on the opposite side there are only aliens. See Universal
Licensing Corp. v. Paola del Lungo S.p.A., 293 F.3d 579, 580-81 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Romero
v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 381 (1959) (dictum) and Dassigienis v. Cosmos
Carriers & Trading Corp., 442 F.2d 1016, 1017 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam)).”).
2013] THEORY VERSUS PRACTICE 2037
unauthorized] procedure would be invalid.” In light of the fore-
going, we allow the petition for reconsideration and now hold
that the suspension of petitioner’s driver’s license is reversed.44
Another example, striking but not atypical, comes from an opin-
ion of a federal judge in New Jersey considering the implications of
a U.S. Supreme Court holding and dictum from the Third Circuit:
The holding of Sell is consistent with dictum in Rennie, which
instructs that, in an emergency, antipsychotic drugs may be
constitutionally administered only when “such an action is
deemed necessary to prevent the patient from endangering
himself or others. Once that determination is made, professional
judgment must also be exercised in the resulting decision to
administer medication.” This portion of Rennie is important in
two respects.... Taken together, therefore, Sell and Rennie en-
dorse the proposition that medical authorities must consider
lesser-intrusive alternatives before involuntarily administering
medication.45
In an additional fifty-three cases (25%), the dictum statement is
simply mentioned in passing in a peripheral section of the opinion.
The lower court does not cite the statement for support, but neither
does it deny that the statement is authoritative or decide in a way
inconsistent with it.46
In the remaining ninety-two cases (43%), the citing court either
stated or implied that what it called dictum was entitled to less
weight than it would carry if a holding. Nevertheless, most of these
cases do not allow a reader to conclude that the court’s opinion
would have been different in any important way if it had considered
the higher court’s statement a holding.
44. Hays v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Servs. Div., 216 P.3d 902, 903 (Or. Ct. App. 2009)
(citation omitted).
45. Brandt v. Monte, 626 F. Supp. 2d 469, 488-89 (D.N.J. 2009) (emphasis and citation
omitted).
46. At this point, some readers may be wondering why a court would bother to point out
that a statement is dictum if it is relying on the statement for support or sees it as irrelevant
to its analysis. We confess that we too are puzzled by this. Our best guess is that the habit of
distinguishing between dictum and holding is so ingrained that judges or their clerks often
make the distinction automatically even when nothing hinges on it.
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In twenty of these cases, the lower court indicated that the higher
court’s subsequent holdings superseded the dictum statement.
Holdings can be superseded by subsequent holdings just as dicta
can; therefore, in these cases the fact that the lower court consid-
ered a statement dictum played no role in its treatment of it.
In another sixteen cases, we coded the dictum statement as
“nondirective.” What we mean by this is that the statement from the
higher court, even if considered binding, could not be understood as
imposing a requirement on the lower court to analyze or decide an
issue in a particular way. Consider the case of Humphrey v. Sapp.47
There the district court confronted this statement from the Sixth
Circuit: “[Absolute] immunity extends to unintentional errors in the
petition [to remove children from their parents’ custody].”48 Had the
question before the district court been whether to recognize absolute
immunity for an unintentional error, this certainly would have
counted as a directive statement. However, the actual case before
the district court involved an intentional misrepresentation. As the
district court noted, the circuit court’s statement could be read to
“imply that an intentional misrepresentation in a petition is not
protected by absolute immunity.”49 Yet the circuit court’s statement
does no more than imply this—if it even does—and a lower court
that ruled that immunity does apply in cases of intentional immu-
nity could not fairly be criticized for failing to follow precedent. In
such cases, the decision to treat a statement as dictum or holding
makes no difference; what matters is that the statement does not
tell a lower court what it should do.
In an additional twenty-three cases, after calling into question
the authority of a precedent from a higher court, the lower court
distinguished the precedent or otherwise indicated that the issue
involved was irrelevant to the decision before it. Most such cases
were easy to code, but we give as an example one that required more
judgment. 
In United States v. Henderson, police went to Henderson’s home
in response to a report of domestic abuse.50 They entered the home,
Henderson ordered them out, and they arrested and removed him.
47. No. 3:09-CV-305-H, 2010 WL 1416705 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2010).
48. Id. at *9 n.3.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. 536 F.3d 776, 777-78 (7th Cir. 2008).
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After he was removed, his wife consented to a search of the house.
The police discovered weapons and drugs, and Henderson was in-
dicted for weapon and drug crimes. At his trial, he moved for sup-
pression of the evidence from the search, as he had expressly
refused permission for the search before being removed.
The key passage for the dictum analysis was from the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Georgia v. Randolph.51 In Randolph, the Court
allowed cotenants to authorize such searches “[s]o long as there is
no evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting
tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objec-
tion.”52 In Henderson, the Seventh Circuit opined that the Randolph
Court’s “passing reference to pretextual arrests carried out for the
purpose of evading an objection to search was not a holding,”53 but
immediately continued:
In any event, the Court’s dicta should not be overread to require
the invalidation of an otherwise valid third-party consent search
where the objecting tenant is removed from the home based on
a legitimate, nonpretextual arrest. Here, Henderson was validly
arrested based on probable cause to believe he had committed a
domestic battery; there is no evidence to suggest he was
removed from the home “for the sake of” evading his objection to
the search.54 
The circuit judges explicitly stated that the line relied on by the
defendant was dictum, and perhaps the belief that it was dictum
played a part in their decision. However, this was clearly not the
crux of the argument. The circuit judges’ main point was that the
line from Randolph did not address the rights of the objecting
tenant in the situation in which he is validly arrested—as all agreed
Henderson was. If the above passage from Henderson did not in-
clude the sentence about “passing reference,” and the sentence
following it were rewritten as “In any event, the Court’s holding
should not be overread,” the argument would not lose any force.
51. 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
52. Id. at 121.
53. Henderson, 536 F.3d at 783 n.5.
54. Id.
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In cases such as this, when a statement that might be considered
dictum is immaterial to a decision now before a court, the decision
whether to treat it as dictum is necessarily also immaterial; the
lower court’s decision will be the same either way. Note that in
evaluating relevance, we approached the question from the per-
spective of the deciding court. That is, if the lower court treated the
issue involved as one that required a decision in the case before it,
we coded the dictum statement as relevant. We did not ask whether,
in some objective sense, deciding the issue was necessary. We coded
it as irrelevant only if the lower court indicated that deciding the
issue was unnecessary.
Finally, in sixteen cases, despite denying implicitly or explicitly
that it was bound by the higher court’s statement, the lower court
nevertheless decided the relevant issue consistently with that
statement. Here, too, each lower court decision would have been the
same in all important respects in a world in which no distinction
was made between dictum and holding. They do not count as
consequential invocations of the distinction.
In the end, our examination of 213 cases uncovered seventeen
consequential invocations of the distinction—that is, seventeen
cases in which there are strong grounds for concluding that the
lower court would have decided some issue differently if it had
understood the higher court’s statement to be a holding rather than
dictum. As shown in Table 1, the numbers break down as follows by
type of court: four in U.S. courts of appeals, seven in U.S. district
courts, and six in state courts.
Recall that we could not examine all of the cases returned by our
Westlaw search; rather, we sampled 20% of the circuit court cases,
5% of the district court cases, and 10% of the state court cases.
Thus, to generate estimates of the total number of consequential
invocations from 2008 to 2010, we must multiply the totals by five,
twenty, and ten respectively. Doing those calculations yields our
best estimates of 20 total cases in the U.S. courts of appeals, 140
total cases in U.S. district courts, and 60 total cases in state courts
for the entire three-year period.
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Table 1: Holding-Dictum Invocation in Case Sample
U.S. 
Circuit
Courts
U.S. 
District
Courts
State
Courts
Total
Positive Citation 16 33 19 68
Passing Reference 7 22 24 53
Dictum Superseded 1 15 4 20
Dictum Nondirective 3 10 3 16
Dictum Irrelevant 10 7 6 23
Decision Consistent with
Dictum 
5 7 4 16
Consequential 
Invocation
4 7 6 17
Total 46 101 66 213
In our view, these numbers are remarkably low, especially when
one considers baselines. The Westlaw database contains 80,421
cases decided by circuit courts between 2008 and 2010, 327,524
cases decided by district courts, and 295,452 decided by state courts.
Thus, our results indicate that the distinction between dictum and
holding plays an important role in lower court decision making in
fewer than 1 in every 2000 federal district court cases (140 out of
327,524) and in fewer than 1 in every 4000 state court (60 out of
295,452) or federal circuit court (20 out of 80,421) cases. Combining
all cases, we estimate that consequential invocations of the holding-
dictum distinction occur about once in every 3200 cases (220 out of
703,397).55 
We acknowledge that some difficult judgment calls underlie these
estimates and recognize that other scholars might consider some
cases we excluded to be consequential invocations. That said, we are
confident that the number of such cases would be too small to
change the central message of our findings. Furthermore, disagree-
55. Although the Westlaw database is fairly complete, not all court opinions are submitted
to it, so some unavailable cases might have met our criteria for counting. However, because
the sample of cases not contained on Westlaw is likely to be skewed toward routine or
procedural dispositions, it very likely contains a smaller proportion of consequential
invocations. Surely, it is safe to assume that the incidence of consequential invocations is not
significantly higher in the missing cases.
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ments would not necessarily go in only one direction; other scholars
might reject some of the cases that made it into our count.56 
We also acknowledge that our Westlaw search strategy probably
missed some cases in which lower courts confronted dicta from
higher courts but did not draw attention to the fact that the state-
ments were dicta. It is, of course, possible that in some such cases
the lower courts chose to disregard statements that otherwise would
have provided important guidance for their decisions precisely
because they were dicta. However, we think it highly unlikely that
there are a substantial number of such cases. As we have already
demonstrated, it is considered perfectly appropriate for lower courts
to point out that a statement from a higher court is dictum, and
they are not reticent about doing so. On the other hand, we suspect
that very few judges would purposefully engage in unprofessional
conduct by pretending not to notice a statement from a higher court
that appears to bear on the case being decided. We think it far more
likely that missing cases involve positive treatments of dicta: lower
courts do not bother to point out that a statement is dictum because
they are drawing on it for guidance or support regardless of its
status. Thus, if the missing cases could somehow be identified and
analyzed, the ratio of positive to negative citations of dicta would
probably be even higher than it is in our study.
 Ultimately, then, we are confident that the picture we present is
accurate in its essentials: the holding-dictum distinction plays a
very limited role in lower court decision making. The average con-
temporary judge could expect to go years at a time without relying
on the concept to reach a decision. For most lawyers, seeing a court
disregard a significant statement from a higher court because it is
dictum will literally be a once-in-a-lifetime experience. 
III. IMPLICATIONS
Our findings suggest that there is a dramatic gulf between dicta-
in-theory—where the line separating dictum from holding is
extremely consequential—and dicta-in-practice—where the holding-
dictum distinction seems largely irrelevant. This gulf matters
56. To enable readers to judge our choices for themselves, we have prepared an appendix
listing the coding for each of the 213 cases we examined in detail. See infra Appendix.
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because by not invoking the distinction, lower courts affect both the
balance of power between themselves and higher courts and the
possibility of minimalist common law decision making. In this
Section, we examine the implications of our findings for the dy-
namics of law making in American courts and for the practice of
lawyers in those courts.
A. Lower Court-Higher Court Dynamics
Before we begin, it is important to note that the case for the im-
portance of our results rests on a premise that higher courts fre-
quently include statements that could reasonably be regarded as
dicta in their opinions. Although we recognize that we cannot
definitely establish this premise, it is highly consistent not only with
commentary from academics and judges57 but also with evidence
from this study. Recall that in the sample we analyzed, we found
213 cases in which a statement from a higher court was labeled
“dicta” or “dictum.”58 Extrapolating to the cases that were returned
by our search but not read, we can assume that there were over two-
thousand such cases from 2008 to 2010. Even recognizing that a
nontrivial portion of the labeled statements could not be considered
statements of law, we are left with a very large number. And these
are just the instances in which a statement was tagged as dictum.
We have no way of knowing how many times a lower court quietly
followed a higher court despite doubts about whether what it was
following was a holding.
Similarly, even though some dicta doubtless escape lower courts’
notice, this phenomenon cannot explain lower courts’ near abandon-
ment of the holding-dictum distinction. We certainly take the point
of commentators who suggest that, because of changing norms and
practices in both opinion writing and legal research, lawyers and
judges have become less alert to the distinction between holding
and dicta.59 For example, today’s lawyers are trained to do legal
research by looking at key words in large databases; the result is
that far less time is spent reading cases, and there is far less
57. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
59. See Fowler, supra note 37; Stinson, supra note 37, at 221; see also Leval, supra note
8, at 1263 (noting that advocates often treat dictum as holding in their briefs).
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awareness of whether language in a judicial opinion is central to the
case holding. Judges and their clerks make use of these same
databases. Nevertheless, it is obvious from the numbers just
reviewed that failure to detect dicta cannot explain what we have
observed. Judges spot dicta often enough for the identification of it
to play a major role in their decisions, but it does not.
It seems, then, our findings must be attributed, at least partially,
to frequent decisions to abide by statements from higher courts even
though they are recognized as dicta. In making these decisions,
judges profoundly affect hierarchical dynamics in courts. They also
shape the way in which law is produced and developed in the judi-
cial system as a whole. They move the legal system away from the
shared, incremental decision making envisioned in traditional
conceptions of common law judging and by contemporary minimal-
ists, and they enable bold law making dominated by higher courts.60
This is true regardless of whether lower courts voluntarily em-
brace dicta or follow it unwillingly. Still, if lower courts follow dicta
against their wishes, we might expect to find them more assertive
about their prerogatives elsewhere. For example, lower courts can
constrain higher court law making through their power to interpret,
limit, and distinguish higher court precedents. On the other hand,
if they willingly embrace dicta, we should expect to find them ceding
power to higher courts in other respects too. Consequently, an
understanding of why lower courts accept dicta could provide insight
into whether the deference found here is likely to hold in other
aspects of their decision making.
To the extent that judges follow dicta unwillingly, it is almost
certainly because they wish to avoid being reversed by a higher
court.61 Reversal, of course, undermines the legal policy preferences
60. The effects of lower court choices may extend well beyond the specific cases before
them by providing higher courts with an incentive to address issues not immediately before
them—knowing that lower courts would follow such declarations. In this way, the minimalist
project of incremental judicial decision making might be further undermined in favor of a
hierarchical system dominated by higher courts (something that formalists might well
embrace).
61. There is disagreement in the literature about the extent to which lower courts
consider fear of reversal in their decision making. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court
Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 398 (2007); David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of
Reversal As an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579 (2003); Kirk
A. Randazzo, Strategic Anticipation and the Hierarchy of Justice in U.S. District Courts, 36
AM. POL. RES. 669, 675-76 (2008).
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of lower court judges. Furthermore, judges may be motivated by
“(1) fear that their professional audience, including colleagues,
practitioners, and scholars, will disrespect their legal judgments or
abilities; (2) fear that a high reversal rate might reduce opportuni-
ties for professional recognition and advancement ... and (3) the
perception that reversal undercuts their de facto judicial power.”62
And judges, trial judges especially, will not welcome the return of
cases that they thought had been cleared from a crowded docket. It
is a small step from the assumption that judges prefer not to be
reversed to the assumption that they will generally avoid taking
actions that invite reversals.
Of the steps that a lower court can take to evade the force of an
opinion from above, calling a higher court’s statement dictum would
seem to be the most confrontational, short of outright defiance.
Compare that practice with distinguishing, for example. The lower
court distinguishing a precedent recognizes both the validity of the
precedent and the lower court’s general obligation to follow it; it
denies only an obligation to follow it in this particular case, which
it claims to be insufficiently related. In contrast, the court crying
dictum denies its obligation to follow the statement from the higher
court in any circumstances; beyond this, it denies the validity of the
statement as an expression of the law. The latter action is a much
more direct challenge to the authority of the higher court, and so it
could expect to attract close scrutiny on appeal.63 Knowing this, the
lower court might accept guidance it would prefer to evade when the
only available ground for evasion is the claim of dictum.
In this account, lower courts are reluctant enablers of higher
court dicta; they would like to disregard it but fear the conse-
quences. If this account is correct, then lower courts may be willing
to employ less confrontational methods, like distinguishing, to reach
results that they prefer and, in so doing, shift control to a degree
62. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior
Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 77-78 (1994) (footnote omitted); see also Dorf, supra
note 13.
63. Judges’ reluctance to rely on the dicta concept may be heightened by the fact that the
line between holding and dictum can be so hard to discern. “If the distinction between holding
and dictum were clearly demarcated, lower courts might not hesitate to ignore higher courts’
dicta. Because the distinction has not been so demarcated, however, declaring a prior
statement dictum is quite similar to overruling a previously established legal principle.” Dorf,
supra note 8, at 2027 (footnote omitted).
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from the court that set the precedent to the courts applying it. Of
course, in failing to challenge dicta, they would still cede much of
their common law power to participate in a dialogue with higher
courts and impose constraints on the law-making power of higher
courts. 
An alternative account is that lower court judges willingly em-
brace dicta; that is, they respect it because they want to, not because
they think they have to. Dicta “can help clarify a complicated sub-
ject” and “can assist future courts to reach sensible, well-reasoned
results.”64 For these and other reasons, it may simply be easier for
a lower court facing a large caseload to follow cues from above
without thinking too hard about whether those cues are authorita-
tive. Or perhaps, the lower court judges simply think it proper to
defer to the views of higher courts, even when those views are not
technically binding. If this second account is correct, then we might
expect them usually to forgo even distinguishing and other less
confrontational means of asserting their own role in law making.
For good or ill, higher courts will dominate the development of
doctrine, and the first announcement of a legal principle will often
have a very strong influence on doctrine.65
Although our evidence does not definitively tell us whether judges
follow dicta reluctantly to avoid being reversed or embrace it will-
ingly, we think it is more supportive of the latter explanation. The
most striking evidence is the large proportion of cases in which
judges, though explicitly noting that a statement is dictum, rely on
it for support or guidance.66 Recall that those cases constitute nearly
a third of our sample.
More subtly, the aversion-to-reversal account is undercut by the
fact that judges use the terms “dicta” and “dictum” so often, even
when discussing statements from higher courts. We encountered a
number of cases in which the lower court indicated quite clearly that
the cited statement was irrelevant to the case before it but added,
unnecessarily, that the statement was dictum. Courts worried that
64. Leval, supra note 8, at 1253.
65. Were this to happen, higher courts would have incentive to address issues not
immediately before them—knowing that lower courts would follow such declarations. See
supra note 60 for the possible result.
66. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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claims of dictum will attract unwelcome attention would probably
not include those gratuitous comments. 
Furthermore, and perhaps more telling, the aversion-to-reversal
account is undercut by comparing the practices of trial and appeals
courts. Trial court decisions, at both the state and federal level, are
often reviewed by higher courts; court of appeals decisions are rarely
reviewed. Moreover, with larger jurisdictions, appellate courts can
have a greater impact on the law and so have more to gain from bold
actions that risk reversal. For both reasons, to the extent that fear
of reversal animates lower court treatment of dicta, one would ex-
pect trial courts to tread more carefully in invoking the dicta con-
cept. Our evidence, however, suggests the opposite. At the federal
level, trial courts relied on the distinction in around 1 in 2000 cases;
appeals courts relied on it in around 1 in 4000 cases.67 Although this
evidence is not conclusive, it does cut against the fear-of-reversal
account.
As interesting as this question is, it is not necessary to answer it
here. For whichever account is more correct, the central lesson of
our study remains the same: by so seldom invoking the distinction
between dictum and holding in consequential ways, lower courts
voluntarily cede an important element of their common law power.
Our evidence makes clear that higher courts can safely assume that
lower courts will not invoke the holding-dictum distinction to rein
them in. Higher courts can issue sweeping rulings that address
questions not immediately before them, knowing that lower courts
will not treat those statements as nonbinding dicta. Lower courts
will either willingly accept them or will grudgingly accept them
while perhaps seeking to limit their reach through their power to
distinguish.68 Lower courts, however, will not be active participants
67. See supra text accompanying note 55.
68. While we highlight two potential motivations for judges—fear of reversal and willful
support of higher court authority—we certainly recognize that judicial decision making, as
Judge Richard Posner says, cannot be “reduced to a single dimension,” but instead, must take
into account that lower court judges increase their utility by advancing their ideological
agenda, “economizing on the judge’s time and effort, inviting commendation from people
whom the judge admires, benefiting the local community[,] ... and the list goes on.” Richard
A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1259, 1269-70 (2005). For our purpose, the key fact is that the failure to meaningfully invoke
the holding-dictum distinction—whatever the reason—fundamentally affects the power of
lower courts to make use of their common law powers and, in so doing, affects the balance of
power between lower and higher courts.
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in the shaping of law in these cases. They will not treat these
rulings as dicta and then seek to influence the development of legal
rules through incremental decision making that builds upon the
essence of the higher court ruling.
B. Dicta-in-Theory Versus Dicta-in-Practice
Our evidence suggests that the distinction between holding and
dictum is at once central to the American legal system and largely
irrelevant. Lawyers, judges, and academics refer to “dicta” and
“dictum” all the time. But lower courts appear quite reluctant to rest
decisions on the ground that dictum is not holding when it really
matters. From a practicing lawyer’s perspective, next to nothing can
be gained by asking a lower court to treat higher court language as
nonbinding dicta.
We do not claim that the holding-dictum distinction has no force
whatsoever in judicial decision making. After all, we found evidence
that it mattered in some cases. And it may be that higher courts
place more weight on the distinction in cases involving their own
precedents—this seems especially likely in federal courts of appeals,
where panels are typically expected to treat decisions from other
panels in the same circuit as binding. Yet even though high courts
are the most important source of precedents, trial and intermediate
appellate courts are the main arenas in which those precedents play
out. From the perspective of lawyers and litigants, law in practice
is, most of the time, what lower courts make it; whether a higher
court might one day repudiate a statement as dictum makes little
difference if at the moment, the statement is tantamount to binding
precedent. Understanding how lower courts treat dicta is crucial to
understanding the dynamics of precedent, holding, and dictum in
the legal system as a whole.
In drawing attention to gaps between theory and practice, in no
way do we mean to suggest that scholars should abandon efforts to
identify the line separating dictum from holding or otherwise desist
from theorizing about dicta. Some of the reluctance of lower courts
to make consequential use of the holding-dictum distinction may
be tied to discomfort over the drawing of this line—a discomfort
scholars could help alleviate. Even if not, if we are right about what
is going on in practice, theorists must still evaluate practice against
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normative standards and offer arguments for change if they believe
lower court behavior is falling short of what it should be.
At the same time, there is a strong argument to be made that
theory entirely divorced from practice can have only limited utility,
especially insofar as it is aimed at lawyers in training or practice
and is meant not only to identify normative ideals but also to help
clarify thinking about how law operates. Ultimately, the ways of the
law cannot be dictated entirely from the outside; in large part they
must emerge from the actions of judges and lawyers over time.
In our view, then, theoretical scholarship is likely to be of greater
value to the extent that it is informed by empirical research. This
observation applies not only to the frequency with which the
holding-dictum distinction is invoked but also to how judges draw
the line in practice. Notably, although we were unable to undertake
a systematic analysis of the specific reasons lower courts gave for
identifying language as dicta (and indeed courts did not always offer
reasons), we very seldom ran across theoretically subtle arguments,
such as that the higher court’s ruling had swept too broadly.
Instead, the typical statement identified as dictum was one in which
the higher court addressed an issue tangential to the ones before
it—for instance commenting on one section of a statute when the
case dealt with another section. We suspect that this represents
another important gap, here between the grounds for identifying
dicta put forward by theorists69 or judges commenting on dicta in
the abstract70 and the grounds judges actually rely on in practice,
with the latter being much narrower.
CONCLUSION
By shifting focus from dicta-in-theory to dicta-in-practice, our
study illuminates the ways that the holding-dictum distinction
matters to judging. By demonstrating that lower courts very rarely
invoke the holding-dictum distinction to reach decisions at odds
with higher court dicta, our study makes clear that dicta-in-practice
is quite different from dicta-in-theory, at least with respect to lower
69. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 9, at 1065; Dorf, supra note 8, at 2006-07;
Greenawalt, supra note 9, at 433-34.
70. See Blackman, supra note 38, at 20.
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court decision making. Neither the admonition against advisory
opinions nor the common law’s embrace of minimalist, fact-specific,
incremental decision making has much impact on lower court judges
dealing with dicta; it seems that they do not see nullifying higher
court rulings as nonprecedential dicta as an important part of their
jobs. The explanation for this is not simply that higher court rulings
do not contain dicta or that lower courts can never sort out the line
separating dictum from holding; the explanation is tied to some
deeper understanding of the judicial function by lower court judges.
The disinclination of courts to challenge dicta from higher courts
may well have profound effects on the balance of power in the ju-
dicial hierarchy. If they like, high courts can speak to any number
of questions not directly before them and expect lower courts to
either follow their advice or make use of some precedent-based dis-
tinction to steer around their decisions. Either way, the power of
higher courts is enhanced; dictum becomes holding in some fashion.
For high courts interested in maximizing their power through broad
rulings, the conflation of dictum and holding is a significant boon
to their authority. In other words, our evidence suggests that the
recent fight between Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg in
the health care decision was beside the point. For lower courts, the
question is not whether the Chief Justice’s Commerce Clause ruling
was essential or “puzzling” and unnecessary;71 for lower courts,
what matters is that the Supreme Court provided guidance on the
scope of Congress’s commerce power.
It may be no coincidence that in recent times higher courts,
especially the U.S. Supreme Court, have taken steps to protect their
turf as authoritative settlers of legal disputes. The Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts, for example, have been criticized for embracing
judicial supremacy, including the issuance of maximalist rulings
intended to limit the discretion of other governmental actors.72
71. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2629 & n.12 (2012) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text
(discussing Roberts’s opinion). 
72. For critiques of the Rehnquist Court, see Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing
Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the
Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1
(2003). For critiques of the Roberts Court, see Adam Cohen, Editorial, Last Term’s Winner at
the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/07/09/opinion/09mon4.html; Richard L. Hasen, Money Grubbers, SLATE (Jan. 21, 2010,
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Perhaps these attacks have been overblown at times, but the Court
has unquestionably made strong claims about the need for adher-
ence to Supreme Court pronouncements, most notably Court inter-
pretations of the Constitution’s meaning, in the American political
system.73
More fundamentally, our findings are consistent with the sense
of other observers that there has been a weakening of the American
system of incremental, minimalist decision making, which is
grounded both in the common law and in the Article III prohibition
against advisory opinions. With respect to the common law, the
holding-dictum distinction simply seems less consequential today
than before. In the United States, as Peter Tiersma observed, 
[T]he common law is embarking on a path towards becoming
increasingly textual .... [I]t is less and less necessary to search
for the holding or ratio decidendi of a case; the judge writing for
the majority will often specify exactly what the holding is in
carefully crafted text that is meant to fetter the discretion of
lower courts in the same way that a statute does. As a conse-
quence, legal reasoning is gradually being supplanted by close
reading.74 
In our view, scholars who care about such issues would do well to
think about the conditions that limit the consequential use of the
holding-dictum distinction. Some of these conditions are tied to the
12:58 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/01/money_
grubbers.single.html; Dahlia Lithwick, The Pinocchio Project, SLATE (Jan. 21, 2010, 2:15 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2010/01/
the_pinocchio_project.html.
73. Consider, for example, this statement by the Rehnquist Court: 
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best when
each part of the Government respects both the Constitution and the proper
actions and determinations of the other branches. When the Court has inter-
preted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the Judicial Branch,
which embraces the duty to say what the law is. When the political branches of
the Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the
Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and
controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them
under settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must
be disappointed.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997) (citation omitted).
74. Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1188
(2007).
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hierarchical relationship between lower and higher courts, including
the desire of lower courts to steer clear of direct confrontations with
higher courts. Others are tied to the persuasiveness of higher court
dicta and the efficiency of looking to cues from higher courts in order
to manage a large caseload. Whatever the exact dynamics at play,
for the study of dicta to have real world significance, scholars must
be cognizant of what courts do and why they do it. This Essay is a
first step in that enterprise. 
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APPENDIX
Coding of Citations of Dicta from Higher Courts
Positive Citation
2010 WL 548446
576 F.3d 979
587 F.3d 1133
616 F.3d 963
2008 WL 5110964
546 F.3d 682
538 F.3d 554
409 Fed. App’x 235
571 F.3d 108
573 F.3d 383
524 F.3d 1350
577 F.3d 672
390 Fed. App’x 963
404 Fed. App’x 291
592 F.3d 954
401 Fed. App’x 877
585 F. Supp. 2d 568
2010 WL 2471693
620 F. Supp. 2d 857
2009 WL 1796763
667 F. Supp. 2d 758
2009 WL 2151197
2008 WL 4372898
2009 WL 995139
2008 WL 5279638
2010 WL 1797412
2009 WL 1905047
2008 WL 4148849
2008 WL 4305921
2008 WL 4133573
595 F. Supp. 2d 735
682 F. Supp. 2d 49
2008 WL 5169640
555 F. Supp. 2d 1013
2009 WL 1287740
544 F. Supp. 2d 59
2008 WL 793660
626 F. Supp. 2d 469
255 F.R.D. 110
719 F. Supp. 2d 7
2010 WL 286641
2010 WL 889292
2009 WL 323219
598 F. Supp. 2d 414
2008 WL 360986
2009 WL 2601245
2008 WL 2404967
2008 WL 346007
2008 WL 5378348
209 P.3d 1130
2009 WL 1395825
2008 WL 963860
2009 WL 497735
977 A.2d 228
2009 WL 4682253
2010 WL 1611391
2009 WL 715990
2008 WL 706610
2008 WL 2815534
744 N.W.2d 237
2008 WL 5540475
2010 WL 4025901
2010 WL 2553453
881 N.Y.S.2d 839
2008 WL 1970919
902 N.E.2d 535
939 N.E.2d 525
216 P.3d 902
Dicta Cited in Passing
605 F.3d 985
526 F.3d 1334
591 F.3d 164
621 F.3d 1069
517 F.3d 911
543 F.3d 744
556 F.3d 1300
2008 WL 4442611
2010 WL 1254841
2008 WL 2199689
723 F. Supp. 2d 987
746 F. Supp. 2d 358
2008 WL 5657801
2008 WL 2915117
686 F. Supp. 2d 956
2009 WL 5166258
684 F. Supp. 2d 179
2009 WL 2710078
2010 WL 3210765
2010 WL 3521979
2010 WL 4638863
2010 WL 5169074
649 F. Supp. 2d 262
659 F. Supp. 2d 727
2010 WL 1332715
2008 WL 4347017
2010 WL 3258134
2008 WL 345547
2008 WL 4525422
327 S.W.3d 570
106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 342
2010 WL 4132525
2010 WL 1579662
775 N.W.2d 895
2009 WL 1887150
2010 WL 3795192
266 S.W.3d 627
49 Conn. L. Rptr. 244
207 P.3d 631
21 So. 3d 987
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2008 WL 3913994
165 Cal. App. 4th 1291
2009 WL 865287
2008 WL 656678
2008 WL 2572617
314 S.W.3d 225
993 A.2d 921
2008 WL 946226
2008 WL 1799952
2008 WL 3893789
2008 WL 5780815
916 N.E.2d 1175
700 S.E.2d 766
Dicta Superseded by
Subsequent Holding
604 F.3d 197
637 F. Supp. 2d 392
2008 WL 4414719
2008 WL 4936489
2009 WL 250278
728 F. Supp. 2d 702
2009 WL 799442
2009 WL 2848670
2009 WL 2987183
724 F. Supp. 2d 132
2008 WL 2397588
2009 WL 3049321
645 F. Supp. 2d 381
2008 WL 4346784
687 F. Supp. 2d 133
2009 WL 734091
197 P.3d 562
2010 WL 2196910
683 S.E.2d 818
2009 WL 3644922
Dicta 
Nondirective
2010 WL 357933
595 F.3d 411
275 Fed. App’x 588
2009 WL 911296
2008 WL 276406
2009 WL 453917
664 F. Supp. 2d 294
2008 WL 4200155
2010 WL 276756
2010 WL 2816374
2008 WL 4198587
2010 WL 1416705
627 F. Supp. 2d 1232
669 S.E.2d 25
2010 WL 2053336
2010 WL 2336833
Dicta Deemed 
Irrelevant by Court
536 F.3d 776
576 F.3d 1
603 F.3d 1127
540 F.3d 231
586 F.3d 1289
595 F.3d 565
534 F.3d 1338
330 Fed. App’x 16
576 F.3d 84
515 F.3d 272
2010 WL 973375
596 F. Supp. 2d 74
2008 WL 2184117
2009 WL 1118782
628 F. Supp. 2d 1152
2010 WL 2666950
730 F. Supp. 2d 624
2008 WL 2132530
2010 WL 1732551
34 So. 3d 183
2010 WL 2135356
997 So. 2d 605
2009 WL 3518211
Court Decision Consistent
with Dicta
626 F.3d 592
598 F.3d 388
531 F.3d 104
630 F.3d 17
608 F.3d 955
2009 WL 3364037
2009 WL 249818
2010 WL 2245029
2008 WL 4600999
2009 WL 3713047
2008 WL 5245329
706 F. Supp. 2d 1029
2008 WL 2752284
174 Cal. App. 4th 1313
39 So. 3d 1172
267 S.W.3d 228
Consequential Invocation
of Distinction
627 F.3d 622
561 F.3d 816
382 Fed. App’x 58
550 F.3d 465
2008 WL 4426345
603 F. Supp. 2d 1275
2009 WL 185941
2009 WL 841139
2009 WL 2219258
2009 WL 1076279
2009 WL 1574465
325 S.W.3d 752
787 N.W.2d 96
261 S.W.3d 111
246 S.W.3d 374
169 Cal. App. 4th 41
282 S.W.3d 331
